The Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Financial Crisis in Eastern European Emerging Economies by Grytten, Ola Honningdal & Koilo, Viktoriia




The Financial Instability Hypothesis 
and the Financial Crisis in Eastern 
European Emerging Economies








The Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Financial 
Crisis in Eastern European Emerging Economies 
 
By  
Ola Honningdal Grytten, NHH Ola.Grytten@nhh.no 





The present paper applies the financial instability hypothesis in order to explain the 
financial crises of 2008-2010 in eleven emerging Eastern European economies Also, it 
seeks to map if institutional frameworks of these countries enabled them to stand against 
the factors leading into the financial crisis. 
The paper maps cycles of three macroeconomic indicators representing the real economy, 
and four indicators representing financial markets. A cycle analysis is conducted with the 
help of a Hoderick-Prescott filter, made to isolate cycles from trends in time series. The 
paper concludes that there were substantial positive financial cycles previous to the 
financial crisis mirrored by similar cycles in the real economy.  
Similarly, the results show negative cycles in the same parameters during the years of 
crisis. It seems as an uncontrolled increase in money and credit caused the economy to 
overheat and thereafter contract in both substantial financial and real economy crises. 
Also, the paper compiles twelve different indices of institutional development. These are 
standardized and presented in an institutional development matrix, showing that the 
institutional framework for the eleven economies was weak previous to and under the 
melt down of the economy.  
The construction of an integrated institutional development index on the basis of the same 
twelve parameters confirm institutional shortcomings, which may have made the 
economies less able to guard themselves from a crisis initiated by both domestically and 
internationally financial instability. 
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The international financial crises, which started with significant fall in housing markets 
during the second half of 2007, hit most Eastern Europeans economies hard from 2008. 
Conventional visdom among economists to a large degree seems to be that the crises was 
transmitted from Western Europe to Eastern Europe by international financial markets, 
causing liquidity crises and thereafter capital crisis, ending up in busts in the real economy 
(Bracke and Martin, 2012, Jungmann and Sagemann, 2011, Åslund, 2018). In addition 
fragile institutions in form of political and domestic financial systems seem to have been 
unable to set up a stronghold against the evolvment of the crisis.  
 
1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This paper investigates the financial crisis in 2008-2010 by two approaches. The first takes 
its departure in the financial instability hypothesis as set up by Minsky (1982: 13-39) and 
Kindleberger (1996). The hypothsis is also in line with the argument of the two nobel prize 
winners in economics Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott. On the basis of empirical 
research on trends and deviations from trends they argue expansion and contraction in 
money and credit be decisive for busiess cycles (Kydland, 1990: 3-18). 
The second approach is to investigate into institutional stability of economies. In other 
words: is there a framework present within the economies capable of both preventing and 
redusing the sclae of financial crises? 
To sum up, the research problem of the paper is to find out if a Minsky-Kindleberger 
approach can throw light on domestic financial instability as a major force for the 
development of the Eastern Europen branch of the international financial crisis This is 
seen in light of important institutional development indicators for these economies.  
The paper offers an anatomy of the financial crisis in eleven emerging Eastern European 
economies, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan and Ukraine. This is done by following the pattern 
of central macroeconomic indicators determining over-all production. We seek to find their 
trend and cycle components by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to map significant short-
term deviations from their long-term equilibriums. Significant positive cycle values might 
indicate financial overheating, and may have caused busts in the economy, measured by 
significant cycle downturns.  
If one finds that booms and busts, or significant business cycles in the real economy follow 
the pattern of financial key indicators as money and credit volumes, one may conclude that 
huge swings in the economies to a large extent can be explained by a Minsky-Kindleberger 
appraoch to the understanding of the evolvement of financial crises. 
 
1.2. OUTLINE 
Thus, the outline of the paper in order to solve the research problem would be as follows: 
It will first discuss the theoretical framework of the Minsky-Kindleberger approach with its 
emphasize on the financial instability hypothesis to explain the evolvement of financial 
crises.  
Secondly, it will investigate the institutional framework of the eleven mentioned Eastern 
Economies by looking at institutional development indicators in order to elaborate on their 
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modernization, integration in to the global economy, and by that their ability to tackle 
situations leading up to financial crises.  
Thirdly, if key variables indicating macroeconomic financial instability follows the pattern 
of the crisis it is likely that it is a result of booms and busts in financial indicators in line 
with the Minsky-Kindleberger approach. Additionally, the level of institutional 
development might contribute to understand to what degree these economies were able to 
handle the situation. 
 
1.3. DEFINITIONS 
Before we present our theoretical framework it is important to clarify our understanding 
of financial crises. We refer to financial crises as situations where financial institutions or 
assets lose significant values and the financial institutions are not able to provide 
necessary means of payment. Goldsmith, defines financial crises as (Goldsmith 1982):  
"sharp, brief, ultra-cyclical deterioration of almost all financial indicators, short-term interest 
rates, asset prices, commercial insolvencies and failure of financial institutions."  
During the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, financial crises were 
associated with bank panics and credit crunches. The modern understanding of financial 
crises includes stock market crashes, financial bubbles bursts, currency crises, and 
sovereign defaults.  
Claessens and Kose (2013) highlights that financial crises are typically multidimensional, 
often associated with one or more of four phenomena: substantial changes in credit volumes and 
asset prices; severe disruptions in financial intermediation and supply of external financing; 
large scale balance sheet problems and large scale government support. 
Drawing on established definitions, we define financial crises as significant negative 
development in several financial indicators, causing credit markets to work irrationally by 
not providing necessary credit to the economy. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Both Minsky and Kindleberger argue that financial crises commonly start with financial 
instability. `  financial markets in particular the markets for money and credit are exposed 
to disturbances that might end in lost sustainable equilibriums (Minsky, 1982 and 1986). 
Hence, their approach is often characterized as the instability hypothesis. According to 
Kindleberger (1996) this might typically happen through significant exogenous 
macroeconomic shocks, causing the economy to run faster by drawing on an extended 
volume of credits. Minsky, on the other hand, pays more attention to endogenous system, 
i.e. shortcomings in order to deal with disturbances in the financial markets. This system 
error makes financial instability to evolve in times of mismatch between short term and 
long term sustainable equilibriums.  
 
2.1. THEORY 
Both agree that positive expectations, after lack of stability has been established, may 
cause demand for credit to increase. Financial stability is lost, and positive credit bubbles 
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arise. Next, both financial markets and the overall economy become overheated due too 
high growth of money volumes. When the money surplus is too high, asset bubbles arise. 
Speculation in continuously growth of asset prices cause bubbles to increase further. The 
expectation of even higher over pricing of assets make the prices increase even more.  
This will go on until markets turn, due to expectations of an obtained price maximum. The 
turn in financial markets is often called the “Minsky Moment”. Thereafter, expected losses 
make markets fall even steeper and deeper. The economy, and in particular asset markets, 
will then be faced credit crunches, crashes, and recessions (Kindleberger and Aliber 2015, 
pp. 33-76). In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we have tried to fomalize the Minsky and Kindleberger 
models for evolvement of financial crises. 
 
Figure 1. Minsky model for financial crises 
 
This formalized version of Minsky’s model of common evolvement of financial crises, go 
through five phases. The first one, Displacement, is the period of time when markets loose 
their natural growth pattern due to a positive shift in demand. If one expects this to be of a 
permanent character, the market moves into its next phase, Overtrading, i.e. too high 
activity compared to sustainable equilibriums. Overtrading promotes the third phase, 
Monetary Expansion, due to increase in demand for credits and willingness to grant such. 
These three first phases come to being due to loss of financial stability. Financial markets 
are not longer secure due to overexpansion of money and credits. 
During these phases Minsky puts emphasis on what is referred to as three-step financial 
taxonomy. This implies that the mot common way to finance investments during periods of 
stable financial markets is hedge financing, basically drawing on business surpluses and 
normal borrowing. In times of rapid expansion and credit growth, speculative finance, 
drawing on future increase in asset prices, is more common. Finally, Ponzi financing 
becomes more common, implying that capital emissions are necessary for further growth. 
Financial security of borrowing money decreases in all these three taxonomy phases. 
Monetary expansion brings the markets to a maximum with an over heated economy and 
asset bubbles. When market expectations turn, markets and asset prices will fall. Hence, 
one has reached the new phase, Revulsion. Negative expectations and corrections will 
dominate and a period of crisis will follow, denoted as Discredit. 
When Minsky gives an endogenous Keynesian model, Kindleberger offers more of an 
exogenous neo-classical model, but still substantially inspired by the Minsky model.  
Kindleberger starts with a exogenous shock, leading to monetary expansion, which the 
financial markets are not able to deal with. This leads to the first phase Manias, with over 
investments in financial markets, implying the creation of euforistic asset bubbles. This is 
followed by Panic. Both these evolve due to loss of financial stability. During this phase the 
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their fundamental values. This leads to credit crunch and Crises, which is the fourth phase 
in this fomalized Kindleberger model. If the crisis lasts it will infect other markets and one 
arrives at the fifth phase Diffusion. 
 
Figure 2. Kindleberger model for financial crises 
 
Kindleberger also puts attention to the impact of hegemonial powers, i.e. actors, whom due 
to their size, standing and role are able to monitor and influence the market significantly. 
Thus, they are decisive for financial stability, as well as the development, depth and the 
way of handling financial crises. 
In extensive empirical studies of international financial crises, Tornell and Westermann 
conclude that the Minsky-Kindleberger approach can be applied for the vast majority of 
financial crises. They also conclude that financial liberalization tends to cause more or less 
irregular boom-bust cycles (Tornell and Westermann 2005). Also, on the basis of empirical 
research Eichengreen argues that financial instability may cause what he denotes as 
illusive stability, which is short-term and fragile financial stability mismatching long-term 
sustainable financial stability (Eichengreen 1990). A similar type of argument is found with 
Reinhart and Roghoff (2009). In 2016 effort was in combining Minsky’s model and 
Kindleberger’s theory with international empirical research and ended up with a formal 
seven phases dynamic model for common patterns on the way to financial crises. (Gtytten 
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Figure 3. Seven-step dynamic model for financial crisis 
 
2.2. METHODOLOGY 
In order to map booms and busts of the economy in form of business cycles and financial 
cycles, the paper seeks to establish measures of these cycles within time series. This is in 
line with the methodology used in a previous paper by Grytten and Hunnes (Grytten and 
Hunnes;, 2014: 25-57). To achieve this we use a Hodrick-Prescott-filter. It separates an 
observed time series (xt) into a trend component (gt) and a cycle component (ct): 
 
(1)     𝑥𝑡 =  𝑔𝑡 +  𝑐𝑡  
 
To identify the components, the HP-filter minimize the variance of ct subject to a penalty 















Here (𝑥𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡) denotes the cycle component and [(𝑔𝑡+1 −  𝑔𝑡) − (𝑔𝑡 −  𝑔𝑡−1)] is the 
difference in the trend growth rate from period t until t+1, whereas 𝜆 controls the 
smoothness of the growth component.  
This implies that a smoothing parameter equal to zero means that all changes in the 
observed series should be explained by trend developments. A high smoothing parameter 
implies that the cycle is an important component in the observed time series.  
One can calculate the cycle component by deducting the trend component from the 
observed time series: 
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High smoothing parameters will give trends with minor fluctuations, and thus, significant 
cycles, when low smoothing parameters will give trends with large fluctuations, and thus, 
minor cycles. Rules of thumb suggest a smoothing-parameter with 𝜆 = 100 for annual 
figures, 𝜆 = 1,600 for quarterly figure, and 𝜆 = 14,400 for monthly figures.  
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The institutional framework the different economies are working under is imperative for 
their development and ability to handle crises (Riaz 2009: 26-35). It decides their level of 
integration and modernization into a global economy. Thus, it is important to look into 
such frameworks for the eleven Eastern-European economies under investigation here. 
This is done by mapping their level of institutional development as a comparative analysis. 
The following study is based on the analysis of indices of these eleven Eastern European 
Economies, which until the 1990s had approximately the same economic systems and 
mechanisms, and, thereafter, began to transform their political and economic systems 
towards market economies (Harris 1999: 125-158).  
 
3.1. DEVELOPMENT OF EASTERN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Reforming the economy on a market-oriented basis has stimulated the emerging 
economies of Eastern Europe to economic integration - a process that is increasingly global 
(Moghadam 2014: 8-13). However, the vectors of integration in different countries are not 
the same. Some countries, are already part of EU (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania), when most of 
the post-Soviet republics are still looking for ways of fruitful cooperation within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and some other forms of integration. However, 
almost all countries of this group have strategic integration goals towards the EU.  
Many important decisions on strengthening the integration remain on paper only or are 
being implemented at different paces. There are several reasons for this (Cerqueira 2018: 
329-333).  
In the first place, it is a consequence of the deep decline of the economies of all CIS 
countries, the breakdown of economic ties between the subjects of the former USSR and 
the difficulties of the transition to market economy.  
Secondly, this situation is also due to political ambitions of party leaders, which is not 
always for the best of international economic integration.  
Thirdly, a shortsighted policy of governments trying to gain benefits for their state at the 
expense of other CIS members causes delay in the integration and modernization process.  
Despite multiple declarations on the need to reduce customs barriers, governments 
operate in the opposite direction: customs posts, quotas, and licensing of mutual trade.  
The newly reformed economies have become unstable, dependent on external factors and 
resource-intensive. At the early stage features of the transition to sustainable development 
were the following: 
 
3.2. REORGANIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION 
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It was assumed that the transfer of enterprises to private ownership would increase their 
efficiency, production of competitive goods and lead to the entering of international 
markets. In practice, the market mechanism was weak, the old principles of regulation 
were maintained, which led to inefficient use of economic potential. 
The economies lost growth opportunities, which were present during the planning system, 
and new opportunities for the market system have not yet been properly formed. There 
was a sharp decline in production during the transition period in the 1990s, as GDP 
dropped 50-70 percent. At the initial stage of privatization, the new owners of enterprises 
were not ready to manage the market principles, strategic development planning and 
business activities, Thus, they directed their efforts to obtain "fast" profits from privatized 
property, which allowed to be enriched regardless of production efficiency. Economic 
success was largely result of a reorientation towards extractive industries, which led to 
excessive exploitation of natural resources and environmental pollution (Roaf, 2014: 10-
28).  
It became imperative to re-establish labor, capital and product markets, to build new 
economic relations, to form consumer markets and to saturate its goods. In addition, the 
new order required new processes related to the life cycle of goods - from search for new 
suppliers of raw materials and replacement of obsolete equipment to search for new 
markets, and marketing strategies for promotion of goods and services.  
It took time to move to efficient management, attracting investments, introducing new 
production and management technologies adequate to the markets. This transition is still 
not completed.  
 
3.3. LIBERALIZATION 
The transition to free market prices under a regime of higher demand than supply led to 
rapid inflation and, thus, low investment activity and export of savings (Njemcevic 2017: 
15-22). Also, problems associated with reduction of trade barriers still have to be solved. 
Imported goods dominate in high-tech and high-skilled product markets. Thus, the Eastern 
European economies have been even more dependent on traditional industries, like mining 
and manufacturing, when to buy modern consumption goods the countries run trade 
deficits, giving way to further export of capital. This has been fueled by foreign credits with 
high interest rates to consumers in order to buy foreign goods.  
 
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
Legislative reform and institutional changes also played an important role for the failures 
of market economy implementation. The ill-conceived liberalization of the economy led to 
dominant shadow economies, with increase in crime and corruption. As result, the risks 
business increased. The legal system was not ready for the changes and necessary reforms 
have been hold back by agents benefiting from the mismatch (Turk, 2014: 199-208).  
Hence, institutional shortcomings seem to be an important obstacle for economic growth 





4. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT MATRIX 
It is of importance to present the current institutional framework of the eleven Eastern 
European economies under investigation here in an orderly manner. Thus, an institutional 
development matrix is presented. This is made up of six categories:  
 
1. Fragility and instability 
2. Environment 
3. Freedoms and rights 
4. Socio-Economics 
5. Gender 
6. Governance.  
 
Each category has two parameters presented as sub-indices. The indices rest on different 
sources, i.e. Transparency International, The Economist Intelligence unit, the World Bank, 
the United Nations (Human Development Report), the World economic forum, the Cato 
Institute, the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, The Global Economy and 
Brookings Global Economy and Development.1 Most data are from 2016-2018. 
The paper makes these series comparable by moderating the indices by the mentioned 
bodies. This is done by transforming scores into indices where the scores of each nations 
parameter, ai, are placed in the interval 0<ai<1. Thus one arrives at an institutional 
development matrix, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
                                                          















Note: FSI - Fragile States Index; ISW - Index of State Weakness; EPI - Environmental Performance Index; EH - 
Environmental Health; IHF - Index of Human Freedom; IEF - Index of Economic Freedom; DB - Doing Business; HDI - 
Human Development Index; GGG - Global Gender Gap Index; GII - Gender Inequality Index; DI - Democracy Index; CPI - 
Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Sources, see footnote 1 
Figure 4. Institutional development matrix for Eastern European economies 
 
It is worth mentioning that the emerging economies continue to present a mixed picture. 
However, the very important parameters of gender equality, democracy and corruption 
perception score alarmingly badly.  
Figure 5 reports the eleven economies scores according to the twelve different indices 
applied here. It puts emphasis to the different scores of the different states and highlights 
shortcomings of the institutional framework for the emerging economies for being 






































3. FREEDOM AND 
RIGHTS




























Sources, see footnote 1 
Figure 5. Scores in the Institutional development indices. 
 
The countries in our sample generally have their highest scores within state weakness, i.e 
the states are relatively strong, in human and economic freedom and human development.  
A democracy score of 0.19 puts Tajikistan as number 159 among 167 countries, when 
Bulgaria is the best achiever among the countries under investigation here, with a score of 
0.70 The Corruption Perceptions Index gives Tajikistan a low score of 0.21, when Georgia 
is at the opposite side of the countries in the sample with a score of 0.56  
To conclude, the above-presented analysis proved a statement concerning a great 
difference in the development inside the group of emerging economies, despite of similar 
initial conditions at the beginning of the independence of each country. Hence, there 
should be highlighted that countries-members of EU show better statistics. Thus, there is a 
significant need to analyze the financial crisis in the eleven Eastern European countries in 
order to find out if significant upturns and downturns were influenced by international, 





































































1. Fragility and instability
Fragile States Index (2018)











































































































































3. Freedoms and rights
Index of human freedom (2016)












































































































































Global Gender Gap index (2018)










































































4.1. INTEGRATED INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INDEX 
On the basis of these series it is possible to construct an integrated index of institutional 
development. In line with the methodology in the Human Development Index published by 
the United Nations, this paper offers a geometric approach. The departure can be explained 









=  √𝑎𝑖 ⋅ 𝑎𝑖+1 ⋅ 𝑎𝑖+2 ⋅ 𝑎𝑖+3 ⋅ … . .⋅ 𝑎𝑛
𝑛  
⋅ 
Here ⊓ is the geometric average of different parameters, a, numbered from i to n. In our 
case these parameters are taken from the structural development matrix: 
 
FSI = Fragile States Index 
ISW = Index of State Weakness 
EPI = Environmental Performance Index 
EH = Environmental Health 
IHF = Index of Human Freedom 
IEF = Index of Economic Freedom 
DB = Doing Business 
HDI = Human Development Index 
GGG = Global Gender Gap Index 
GII = Gender Inequality Index 
DI = Democracy Index 
CPI = Corruption Perceptions Index.  
 













By setting in to this equation (5) one arrives at an integrated institutional development 
index. This shows that Georgia, Romania and Belarus had the highest level of development 




Sources, See footnote 1 
Figure 6. Integrated Institutional Development index, emerging economies Eastern 
Europe (2016-2018). 
 
In sum, the institutional development in the eleven Eastern European countries under 
investigation seem fragile, meaning that modernization and the possibility of integration 
into a global economy is limited. Thus, these economies framework is not the best for 
meeting a financial crisis. 
 
5. CYCLE ANALYSIS 
By using the HP-filter in order to separate trend and cycle components one might be able 
to find out if financial stability indicators, such as money stock and credit volumes, could 
have paved way for the financial crisis. In other words, rapid increase in money and credits 
could have caused demand driven booms and overheating in the economy. This can be 
seen in positive deviations from trend, i.e. positive cycles. 
By using World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD, Eurostat and United Nation’s 
data sorted and presented by the Federal Reserve bank of St Louis, one might be able to 
trace such developments (FRED, 2019).2 We have been able to look at seven key 
macroeconomic indicators. First we look at productive measures as domestic product, 
manufacturing output and unemployment. How did these behave before and during the 
crises? Than we look at financial indicators money, credits, government debt and inflation. 
It would have been preferable to look at parameters such as asset prices and market 
interest rates. Arguably, the analysis may also have benefited from using quarterly data. 
One would also have preferred to include data starting at the fall of the iron curtain in 
1991. 




























However, lack of more detailed valid and reliable data with sufficient coverage and without 
too much noise basically limits the paper to use annual data for the period 1996-2017. 
By using the HP-filter as described in equation (1) – (3) one is able to map cycles from 















where the cycle component min
𝑔𝑡
∑ (𝑥𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡)
2𝑇
𝑡=1  is the residual. Thus, setting into the 
equations gives the following relationship: 
 
(7) 






In other words: cycles are found be deducting the smoothed parameters of gross domestic 
product, manufacturing output, unemployment, money stock, credit volumes, inflation and 
government debt from their respective observed series for every year in question. All the 
parameters, except unemployment and government debt is supposed to be pro-cyclical. i.e. 
the cycles expand in size during booms in front of the crisis and contact during the crises. 
As for unemployment and government debt, they should be counter-cyclical as they tend to 
contract in good times and expand in bad times.  
The peak values of the cycles previous to the financial crisis for the seven parameters are 
reported in table 1 and the troughs or minimums in table 2, where the numerics are 
presented as natural logarithms: 
 
(8)     ct = log(xt)- log(gt) 
 
This implies the table reports relative cycles. The years of peaks and troughs are reported 
under the relative numerical cycle values. The precise parameters can be listed as such: 
 
Y = gross domestic product in fixed prices, national currencies 
MP = Manugacturing production in fixed prices, national currencies 
U = Unemplyment rate 
M3 = Money stock as broad definition in current prices, national currencies 
C = Domestic credits 
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P = Inflation rates, measured by increase in consumer price indices. 
GD = Government debt as percentages of gross domestic product in current prices, national 
currencies 
 
Also, p denotes peak moment during a boom, when t denotes trough, as the bottom of a 
burst or recession. 
 
Table 1. Relative numerical cycle values of macro praramteres of peaks before 
financial crises of 2008-2010 as natural logarithms. 
  Real economy indicators Financial indicators 
Country Yp MPp Up M3p Cp Pp GDp 
    
 
  
   
  
Armenia 0,159 0,233 UD 0,213 0,356 0,694 -0,580 
  (2008) (2008) UD (2007) (2008) (2008) (2008) 
Azerbajan 0,120 0,158 -0,060 0,023 0,200 1,010 -0,577 
  (2007) (2007) (2008) (2008) (2008) 2008 (2008) 
Bulgaria 0,086 0,116 -0,587 0,175 0,215 0,876 -0,328 
  (2008) (2008) (2008) (2008) (2008) 2008 (2005) 
Belarus 0,058 0,068 -0,026 0,138 0,241 0,996 -0,311 
  (2008) (2008) (2005) (2008) (2008) 2011 (2008) 
Georgia 0,073 0,043 -0,070 0,097 0,209 0,646 -0,430 
  (2007) (2007) (2007) (2008) (2008) 2008 (2007) 
Kazakhstan 0,059 0,063 -0,011 0,187 0,103 0,763 -0,483 
  (2007) (2007) (2007) (2008) (2008) 2008 (2007) 
Kyrgyz Republic 0,043 0,035 -0,082 0,118 0,185 1,048 -0,284 
  (2008) (2008) (2007) (2007) (2008) 2008 (2008) 
Moldova 0,056 0,062 -0,435 0,342 0,345 0,363 -0,464 
  (2008) (2008) (2008) (2008) (2008) 2008 (2008) 
Romania 0,121 0,185 -0,189 0,118 0,209 0,348 -0,572 
  (2008) (2008) (2008) (2008) (2008) 2008 (2008) 
Tajikistan 0,019 0,147 -0,008 0,149 0,122 0,681 -0,250 
  (2008) (2006) (2008) (2007) (2008) 2008 (2008) 
Ukraine 0,109 0,150 -0,210 0,372 0,348 0,917 -0,780 
  (2008) (2007) (2007) (2008) (2008) (2008) (2007) 
                
UD = Undecisive 
 
Table 1 reveals that all the eleven countries experience a peaking GDP in 2007 or 2008, 
when the picture is very similar for manufacturing output and unemployment, i.e. 
manufacturing peaked almost simultaneously, when unemployment was at a temporary 
minimum. 
As for the financial indicators, we find that both money stock peaked in 2007 or 2008 for 
all the eleven countries, when credits peaked unanimously in 2008. The same did inflation, 
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apart from in Belarus. Public debt also reached a minimum in the years leading up to and 
including 2008. 
Table 2 reports the troughs during the financial crisis. The pace and the depth of the 
constraction was far less uniform than the upswing before the crisis. However, most real 
value indicators reached their bottom point during 2009 and 2010, but admittedly with 
some late comers. Looking at the financial indicators or parameters, both money and credit 
tend to reach their minimum before or simultaneously with the real economy indicators, 
when inflation and, even more, government debt seem to lag compared to the other 
variables. This can hardly come as a surprise for government debt, since it often becomes a 
mean of symptom relief during financial crises. 
 
Table 2. Relative numerical cycle values of macro praramteres of troughs during 
financial crises of 2008 as natural logarithms. 
  Real economy indicators Financial indicators 
Country Yt MPt Ut M3t Ct Pt GDt 
    
 
  
   
  
Armenia -0,047 -0,125 0,064 -0,054 -0,020 -0,300 0,213 
  (2010) (2009) (2010) (2010) (2009) (2009) (2009) 
Azerbajan 0,012 -0,012 0,001 -0,128 -0,020 -1,666 0,304 
  (2012) (2011) (2011) (2008) (2009) (2009) (2016) 
Bulgaria -0,033 -0,031 0,323 -0,010 0,022 -0,509 0,454 
  (2014) (2010) (2013) (2008) (2010) (2009) (2011) 
Belarus 0,011 0,009 0,380 -0,077 -0,052 -0,003 0,253 
  (2009) (2009) (2010) (2009) (2009) (2013) (2014) 
Georgia -0,043 -0,062 0,144 -0,105 -0,054 -1,051 0,159 
  (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) (2010) (2009) (2010) 
Kazakhstan -0,028 -0,002 0,006 0,037 -0,161 -0,086 0,020 
  (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) 
Kyrgyz Republic -0,015 -0,182 0,026 -0,034 -0,082 -0,223 0,047 
  (2010) (2012) (2010) (2009) (2010) (2009) (2010) 
Moldova -0,047 -0,170 0,263 -0,411 -0,024 -0,063* 0,015 
  (2009) (2009) (2010) (2010) (2010) (2009) (2012) 
Romania -0,039 -0,117 0,053 0,005 -0,100 -0,288† 0,179 
  (2012) (2012) (2011) (2009) (2010) (2009) (2012) 
Tajikistan -0,017 -0,159 0,055 -0,081 -0,340 -0,384 0,086 
  (2010) (2010) (2010) (2010) (2009) (2009) (2011) 
Ukraine -0,064 -0,118 0,137 -0,145 -0,135 -0,239* 0,149 
  (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) (2008) (2013) (2010) 
                
* = Actual deflation rate 
† = Fall in inflation rate 
  
The calculations made here reveal considerable expansion in money and credits for all 
emerging eleven Eastern European economies under investigation previous to the financial 
crisis of 2008. For ten of these economies, all but Azerbajan (23 percent), the positive cycle 
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value reached between 9.7 (Georgia) and 37.2 (Ukraine) percent. As for the credit cycle, it 
peaked between 12.2 (Armenia) and 35.6 (Azerbajan). This shows that the domestic 
monetary expansion was substantial prior to the crisis, and it happened after a period of 
attempts of cautious monetary policy in most of these countries. Money and credit 
expansion made the inflation cycle step up to between 34.8 (Romania) and 104.8 (Kyrgyz 
Republic) over the smoothed trend line, which is exceptional. In other words, the countries 
lost their financial stability. 
In consequence of this overheating, the financial crisis hit hard. In Ukraine's and Armenia's 
annual GDP fell by 14.4 and 13.4 percent respectively, and 7.2 and 5.9 percent in Romania 




So what happened? After the transition crisis from communist to a market economies in 
the 1990s, most Western European economies gained momentum as they saw substantial 
economic growth prior to the crisis. This went on for almost a decade and lasted more or 
less until the Autumn of 2008. During this period of growth these emerging economies 
benefited from an underutilized real and human capital. Additionally, they took part in the 
international boom from the early 2000s. 
Nevertheless, the growth was not sustainable. The countries ran huge current account 
deficits, and by that they developed increasingly high foreign debt along with dubious 
exchange rates for their currencies. 
Belarus, Bulgaria and Ukraine had fixed rates of their currencies, which attracted massive 
inflows of short-term lending, giving fuel to monetary expansion, domestic loans and high 
inflation.  
Foreign credit institutions were able to lend to Ukrainian consumers to interest rates of 
amazing 50 percent (Stroe 47-52). Thus, foreign exchange inflows accelerated imports and 
the balance of payments deficits rocketed. Due to very high inflation and balance of 
payments deficits it became impossible to maintain fixed exchange rates for currencies. 
Thus, they had to give up the policy and exchange rates fell drastically, paving way for 
imports of even more inflation and lack of trust of these economies (Åslund, 2010). 
During spring and summer 2008, it must have been evident that the economies of the 
region were overheated. These countries lack valid and reliable real estate price indices 
However, real estate prices were out of control due to high demand caused by monetary 
expansion and low supply. Wages had increased dramatically for skilled workers and the 
booming stock markets had begun to fall down. 
The bank crises had been revealed in the US the early Autumn of 2008, banks didn't dare to 
renew their credits to other banks. Hence, domestic and international financial liquidity 
became extremely scarce. During a few weeks Eastern Europe saw rapid decline in 
international finance and a liquidity crisis evolved rapidly, soon revealing a solidity crisis 
in the private sector due to the high gearing with foreign and domestic capital. Along with 
the lack of liquidity and solidity, financial panic made capital flee the Eastern Europeans 
economies quite rapidly, and their currencies were sold for gold, dollars, euros, pounds 
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and Swiss francs (Mihalijek 2010). Making the currencies to dive further, making these 
countries even more dubious means of foreign investment. 
A fundamental problem for the crisis in Eastern Europe was excessive inflows of short-
term bank credits, enticed by fixed exchange rates. Hence, foreign private debt rocketed. 
Public finances, however, seemed to be under control, with an exception for Romania (and 
Hungary). However, public debt arised during the crisis due to reduced tax income and 
need for government support to reduce the impact of the financial downturn. (Dudas, 
2013: 184-193).  
To sum up, the present analysis confirms that the financial instability hypothesis 
contributes significantly to understand the financial crisis of the eleven emerging eastern 
European economies. Hence, the financial crisis of emerging Eastern European economies 
doesn't seem very different from traditional financial crises 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper seeks if it is relevant to explain the financial crisis of 2008-2010 in 
eleven emerging Eastern European economies with departure in the financial instability 
hypothesis as formulated by Minsky and Kindleberger. To do so it follows three key time 
series for the real economy and four for financial markets in these countries. 
By using the Hodrick-Prescott filter as a structural time series analysis it has been possible 
to map cycles from trends in the series. The analysis reveal substantial overheating in the 
economy mirrored in huge expansion in financial and real economy indicators prior to the 
crisis, when the same variables contracted correspondingly during the crisis. Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that loss of financial stability was an important element in the 
foreplay of the crisis. 
By constructing an institutional development matrix and an integrated institutional 
development index, one finds that the economies under investigation did not have the 
necessary institutional strength to withstand the crisis. 
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5. Dudáš, T. (2013). The impact of the global economic crisis on the public finances of Central and Eastern 
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